Dad. Soccer fanatic. Business ethicist and consultant at SAI Global. Technology futurist. Aspirational humanist. Doctoral student at University of Southampton's School of Management. Author of forthcoming textbook An Introduction to Business Ethics and articles on applied compliance and ethics. Research interests center around ethical decision-making in the business context: corporate culture, organisational behaviour, cognitive bias and behavioural ethics.
ncaisclasscount <- as.data.frame(table(whd$naics_code_description))
sortedncaisclass <- ncaisclasscount[order(-ncaisclasscount$Freq),]
topfifteen <- sortedncaisclass[1:15,]
barplot(topfifteen$Freq, names.arg=topfifteen$Var1, las = 2, cex.lab=.1, horiz=TRUE)
For ease of interpretation, I then put it into a horizontal barchart df2 <- as.data.frame(table(whd$trade_nm))
big2 <- subset(df2, Freq > 10)
sorted2 <- big2[order(-big2$Freq), ]
topten <- sorted2[1:10 , ]
barplot(topten$Freq, names.arg=topten$Var1)
which resulted in (click here for PDF version): This chart, in The Economist about how the UK has fewer constituents per representative than any other developed country, got me thinking about governance and how organisational size impacts productivity:
This morning's New York Times featured a fascinating article on a number of yet unpublished studies on high school bullying called "Web of Popularity, Achieved by Bullying". Whereas most studies of bullying have previously focused on out-group members, social outliers, and pathological bullies, these studies have tried to determine the extent of bullying within the primary social groups of high school. So, instead of looking at the nerds, geeks, and dweebs, (and the badly adjusted kids who are assumed to victimise them) these studies look at everyone, including popular and moderately popular kids.
What they found seemed to surprise the researchers but shouldn't really come as a surprise to anyone with a vivid memory of high school (or parents of teenagers, for that matter). Instead of bullying being focused on out-group members, it seemed to be used primarily as a means gaining and solidifying status in the social hierarchy. Interactions between rivals, kids who were close to each other on the social ladder and who were jockeying for position, were most likely to be aggressive or bullying. When students reached the "top" of the social ladder, they stopped aggressive behaviour not because they were nice people, the researchers hypothesise, but instead because they no longer needed to be agressive to gain position.
While there are a lot of questions still to be answered in the final version of the research, I think there are some substantial implications for the business world. A plurality of the comments under the Times article reflected my first thought: high school actually mirrors much of the business world. Although I've had the privilege to work in some very enlightened, very non-aggressive environments, that has by no means been the case everywhere I've worked. What's most interesting in the high school study is the motivation for such aggression and it's less obvious manifestations (sarcasm, unconstructive criticism, gossip): movement up the social hierarchy. In my experience, that motivation extends into the business world, as well. Workers use these negative tools as ways of climbing or solidifying their places in the often very hierarchical world of business. In a world where your title is a proxy for your value to the company, it's natural that people would use whatever tools at their disposal to claim those titles, even if the net effect is less trust, less productivity, and less value to the company.
Recent research and case studies suggest that by taking away multiple layers of management and flattening the hierarchy, the incentives for agressive and near-aggressive behaviour are eliminated. Horizontal governance structures, while counter to the corporate tradition of command and control governance, seem to enable trust, productivity, and value creation. While I'm afraid (especially given my own kids' social struggles in middle school) that there's not much we can do to eliminate the social hierarchy that kids seem to create all on their own (though I could be/hope I am wrong about that), corporate governance structures are something that are within a firm's control. More than that, by developing the sort of work environments which foster trust, collaboration, and the development of powerful networks by the elimination of unproductive (or, indeed, counterproductive) hierarchies, firms can become more effective competitors in a world where these are the very qualities that will determine the winners.
Whenever I see a parent who has a toddler at the end of a leash, my first reaction is one of horror. But my girlfriend always reminds me that nobody just gets the leash. No parent arbitrarily decides putting their kid at the end of a tether would be a good idea; they do it because, at least once, their toddler tried to run out into the street. Though the Chamber of Commerce seems to be horrified by the proliferation of regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act, it's precisely the same situation. The financial services industry earned the leash.
I try to steer away from political topics on the blog. They tend to divide people more than they bring them together and often provide more heat than light. A post by the formerly mainstream, now free-market-fundamentalist Chamber of Commerce has inspired me to break that proscription, however, because it goes directly to the issues of ethic, risk, and compliance.
The page, http://www.chamberpost.com/2011/01/dodd-frank-unleashes-a-tsunami-of-regulation-a-visual.html, features a very well-done graphic on the number and scope of rules and regulations mandated by the Dodd-Frank act. The contention is clearly that the overwhelming profusion of regulatory activity is going to damage U.S. competitiveness as a provider of capital market services.
What it missing from the discussion is a review of why Dodd-Frank was enacted in the first place; the capital markets have proved, over and over, utterly incapable of regulating themselves. The fact is that there were trillions of dollars of real value lost in the financial meltdown of 2007/2008, and no one has gone to jail, and almost no one lost their job, and all the bankers and bond traders and rating agency executives got to keep the billions of dollars in bonuses they made in the run up to 2007. So the scoreline reads Wall Street 3-0 Main Street.
We have laws for a reason. In a world with both limited resources that must be competed for and the unlimited right to stockpile those resources, some people will do things that may not be illegal but that are unethical. In some spheres of life the social pressure against doing the unethical countervails the reward. Additionally, some people are just decent and won't exploit others on principal. But as the rewards grow into the millions and billions, like they do in the capital markets, internal and external non-legal pressures fail and we get collusion, insider-dealing, and revolving-door quid-pro-quo deals.
Furthermore, risk is hard. All the academic research suggests that people are not wired to understand risk well, especially when it occurs at the far ends of the bell curve (we tend to overestimate rare risks and underestimate common risks). Without incentives to understand it correctly (i.e. that the companies themselves will be left holding the bag in case of failure), it gets ignored and/or externalised.
And that's precisely what happened in the subprime, derivatives, and insurance scandals of the last half of the decade. And, as above, what essentially resulted was a huge wealth transfer from the investors and taxpayers to the financial services companies. Through both the bonuses that happened in the run-up and the the bail-out in the aftermath, the capital markets firms internalised return but externalised risk.
So while the infographic on the COC website might make Dodd-Frank seem like an overreaction, remember what it is reacting to. There is absolutely no reason, given the evidence of recent and/or past history, to think that the capital markets can overcome the human tendencies for greed and risk ignorance. In the long run, prudent regulation makes the capital markets more competitive by increasing stability and transparency. And that's what really want out of Wall Street, not seven figure bonuses.
I've got a long-ish consulting engagement that's taking a lot of my time right now, so blog posts will be a little thin on the ground for while. What I do find time for is the occasional LinkedIn group debate, this one on the Ethics Professionals group, debating the original poster's view that Codes of Ethics do nothing to stop unethical behaviour. I, and others, jump in.
I’m a big fan of game theory, especially when looking at strategic or ethical questions. By stripping away extraneous information and formalizing interactions among actors, interesting and sometimes surprising consequences emerge. I find this particularly interesting when looking a possible responses by competitors to my clients’ strategic initiatives. Lately, though, I’ve been thinking about what actual games can tell us about how people view themselves, others, and third parties in the context of business ethics. My experience of refereeing soccer matches has led me to conclude that there are some substantial barriers to effective ethical decision making that need to be taken into account when designing systems to increase the likelihood of ethical behaviour.
For the past several years, in addition to coaching my kids’ teams and playing the occasional match myself, my son and I have traveled throughout our area as hired referees for leagues and tournaments. Since my son is young we usually work with younger players (U12 and under) but I’ve occasionally worked up through the adult leagues. It’s a difficult job that requires a knowledge of the game as well as quick reflexes, a degree of fitness, and a thick skin. Over the years, I noticed what can only be called a failure in perception on the part of coaches, parents, and players. It is simply this: no one ever thinks the referee is biased toward their team. Of the 100+ matches I’ve been the centre ref for, in perhaps half of them I’ve been accused by both sides of being biased against them. Now this might be just a thing that soccer parents and coaches say, but if it is something these people believe (and I think they do) I think it tells us something important about human nature which has important consequences for how we teach people about business ethics.
If you look at this issue formally, we’d say that for every match, there are three possible cases regarding the referee’s bias: he/she is unbiased, biased for the home team, or biased toward the away team. Leaving aside the fact that no referee I know cares at all who wins the matches they officiate, if we allow for the possibility of referee bias we have only those possibilities. To be biased against both teams would be nonsensical. Therefore, if the perception of the fans is accurate (and assuming a random, symmetrical distribution of bias), on average you would find that of the times when fans thought the referee was biased, half the time it would be against your team, half the time against the other team. And yet anyone who spends any time around soccer (and I’m assuming other sports) knows that this is not true. As above, almost no one ever says “boy, that referee was certainly biased in favour of our team”.
It might be tempting to write this off as something that is purely the domain of recreational supporters of sports teams, but I don’t believe it is. I think it tells us something very important about the way people view the members of their in-groups (in this case, members of the team they support) and how they privilege those members with an assumption of moral superiority. People imagine or assume that people belonging to their in-group (whether it is a sports team, company, church, etc.) have good intentions and that any transgressions are the result of a mistake, a misinterpretation, or ignorance. Instead of judging the actions by both in-group and out-group members by the same ethical/behavioral yardstick, we adjudge the wayward actions of the other team or the other company to be the result of malice or intentional wrongdoing.
The philosopher and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr wrote about this same tendency in individuals calling it the “self-regarding instinct.” He thought it was universal and believed that it was the basis for much of what passes for institutional evil in the world. What I’m suggesting is that we often do the same thing in terms of groups we belong to and that much of what we allow in our companies that is clearly not ethical to an outsider falls under this same distortion of perception. When a fellow employee bends the rules or falls a little short in their compliance duties, because he or she is a member of our team, we are likely to see it as unintentional, unavoidable, or not his or her fault. There is a sort of “reality distortion field” around members of our own team/group/company.
I’m not suggesting that we should never understand the context of our own and other’s actions as a mitigating factor in ethical judgments. I’m actually suggesting two things: that we design systems that take this perceptual distortion into account when we are looking at our own firms and that we keep try to contextualise the behaviour of people in other firms.
I’m not naive enough to think soccer moms and dads are going to take time to reflect about how they favour their own kids’ teams and therefor give me a break when I’m officiating their matches on Saturday mornings. I do hope one day they, as a group, will become a little more balanced in their expectations (see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r0qGeADPzAs for more), but part of the fun is really in rooting for your team. In the business world, however, the “in-group regarding instinct” can lead to the excusing of clearly unethical behaviour in one’s firm and the assumption of guilt in others. While clearly more research needs to be done in this area (and please, if you have any references on similar research, I’d really appreciate them), just the knowledge of this perceptual shift may be enough to mitigate some of the worst of the resulting transgressions.
On the Society for Corporate Compliance and Ethics web site forum, I came across this post. Though personally I'm very distressed (perhaps overly so) by people who cut lines, don't use their turn signals, etc., I don't think that the original author's point (whose name I've omitted) is supported by his argument. People, by and large, only follow rules if:
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Original Message:
Sent: 06-28-2010 11:41
Subject: Ethics Without Compliance
This message has been cross posted to the following eGroups: Ethics Forum and Chief Compliance Ethics Officer Network .
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On Friday I saw some behavior that made me wonder if a faith in ethics is worth having, absent a strong compliance regime.
I was on a plane and, after the doors closed, the flight attendants made the usual announcement about turning off all electronic devices until ten minutes after take off. It's a rule that is announced on every flight, but as every frequent flyer knows, it is poorly enforced. The flight attendants often don't notice people breaking it, and many hide their use of the devices. Plus, some people honestly forget and leave their phones on the entire flight.
Such was the case on the flight I took on Friday. After the announcement was made many people pretended not to hear it and went on tapping away at keyboards. When the flight attendant spotted them and told them to turn their devices off immediately, some did, but my seatmate only pretended to. As we were taxiing out to the runway, I saw her checking Facebook statuses on her iPhone. All I could think was "I know your iPhone is highly unlikely to cause the plane to crash, but is it really worth taking a risk on the safety of a couple of hundred passengers just to read that Cindy is psyched for the weekend?"
Bottom line is, she didn't believe in the rule, knew no one would be monitoring it effectively, and chucked any ethical considerations.
She wasn't alone. Within seconds of the plane's liftoff I was amazed at the number of iPads, iPods and other devices that were up and running. I seemed to be the only one waiting to hear the double chimes indicating it was now safe to use approved electronic devices.
Why did they do it? There was a rule that they didn't believe was worth following, it got in the way of what they wanted to do, and there was no real effort at compliance. And what about the ethical considerations about potentially putting others at risk? They made a calculus and, not surprisingly, found in their own interest.
It's no different, as I've written before, at the ten item or less line at the supermarket, another weak compliance environment. It's exceedingly rare for a clerk to turn anyone away for having too many items. So, a significant percentage of the population will try and sneak in with as many items as they can.
All this makes me wonder: can we talk seriously about business ethics without their first being regular and strict compliance? To be fair, not everyone cheats on the 10 item or less line or turns on their phone when they shouldn't, but the numbers are high enough to make me wonder about the potential mayhem it would create in a business setting.
Ethics is often discussed as being useful for navigating the gray areas, but that assumes someone is policing the line between black and white.
There are many who argue that we should put ethics first and compliance second. I'm starting to think it would be a disaster.
Am I onto something or should I stop flying so much?
The author of The Failure of Risk Management, Donald Hubbard, wrote me a very kind note with regards to my recent review of his book. He rightly pointed out that his view of unproven or failed risk management methods didn't necessarily amount "virtiol". Just because he asserts (and persuasively argues) that these methods are wrong doesn't imply any motive beyond discerning the truth. I considered this when I wrote the article, that merely because one doesn't follow the "he said, she said, on the one hand this, on the other hand the other" format of many academics and journalists doesn't mean that one is being unfair. Beyond the compelling content, I actually think this break from a stale, purely dispassionate writing style is what makes this book a fun read (Taleb is good reading for the same reason). I'm sorry if that didn't come through in the original review.
Douglass Hubbard, in The Failure of Risk Management: Why It’s Broken and How to Fix It, presents a strongly worded critique of qualitative risk management methodologies. For something that might be perceived as dry as risk management, Hubbard’s disdain for most of those who practice non-mathematical risk analysis keeps this ultimately persuasive book entertaining. While his vitriol sometimes detracts from the rhetorical effectiveness of his argument, one comes to understand his frustration at those who pedal unproven, possibly worse-than-useless risk analysis techniques. This is a field, as we’ve seen recently with both the global financial meltdown and the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill, where failures have the potential of having effects far beyond individual firms. With all his focus on debunking common qualitative methods, though, Hubbard doesn’t stop there. He ultimately mounts a defence of quantitative modelling (so excoriated by many in the wake of the sub-prime debacle) and makes some very useful, practical suggestions on how to use qualitative models (such as Monte Carlo and Bayesian analysis) effectively.
In order to examine how successful risk management has been, Hubbard divides the approaches to risk management into four categories based on who originally devised them:
* Actuaries
* War Quants
* Economists
* Management Consultants
Hubbard sees the first three as comprising progressively more sophisticated methods of analysis. From the actuarial tables of insurance companies, to Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) devised to predict failures in complex war logistics (and which lead ultimately to Monte Carlo analysis, of which Hubbard is a devotee), to the MPT (Modern Portfolio Theory) of Harry Markowitz and options theory of Black, Scholes and Merton, Hubbard sees the increasingly probabilistic yet thoroughly quantitative views of risk as being all to the good. The problem with these methods, however, is that they are not always intuitive and can be difficult to perform (anyone who has ever tried to do Monte Carlo analysis without the aid of a computer will attest to this).
This difficulty leads to what Hubbard really thinks is the real problem with risk management: management consultants. As a consultant myself, I try not to take this personally, but Hubbard’s analysis is spot-on. The ability to make people believe there is a real analysis happening, yet distilling it into easy, Powerpoint-ready chunks, is the real talent of many consultants. Drawing from his own experience as an MBA consultant with Coopers & Lybrand in 80s, he points how “structured methodologies,” which have all the appearance on being based on proven theories and which are easily graspable by non-technical senior managers, are not only doing no good for their clients but mask serious risk issues. An example of this is the typical matrix chart, such as this:
Sell what feels right. Clients will not be able to differentiate a placebo effect from real value in most risk management methods. The following tricks seem to work to produce the sense of value:(You see what I mean about how his presentation lacks even the appearance of impartiality).The net result of this has been that the most popular risk management methodologies today are developed in complete isolation from more sophisticated risk management methods known to actuaries, engineers, and financial analysts. Whatever the flaws of some of these quantitative methods, the methods developed by the management consultants are the least supported by any theoretical or empirical analysis.
- Convert everything to a number, no matter how arbitrary. Numbers sound better to management. If you call it a score, it will sound more like golf, and it will be more fun for them.
- As long as you have at least one testimonial from one person, you are free to use the word proven as much as you like.
- Use lots of “facilitated workshops” to “build consensus.”
- Build a giant matrix to “map” your procedure to other processes and standards. It doesn’t really matter what the map is for. The effort will be noticed.
- Optional: Develop a software application for it. If you can carry on some calculation behind the scenes that they don’t quite understand, it will seem much more like magic and, therefore, more legitimate.
- Optional: If you go the software route, generate a “spider diagram” or “bubble chart.” It will seem more like serious analysis.
Any discussion of ethics, whether in the business domain or elsewhere, runs the risk of devolving into an argument over religious beliefs. This is at least partially because the distinction between the two isn't well appreciated by many. A recent exchange on a LinkedIn Business Ethics group illustrates this, and my response was meant to somewhat gently point out that ethics and religion, though related, can't be identical if civil discussions of ethical matters are to succeed.
Sheila wrote:
My thoughts are that I feel I am subjected to tolerate and forced to watch all sorts of lifestyles and belief systems that are very different from mine both on TV and in public but yet when I speak up and share my lifestyle of Christian faith and the biblical ethics I struggle to uphold, I am made to feel like I am doing something socially wrong...??? I can't understand where that is acceptance? I feel that if a school system can have events that discuss alternate beliefs and lifestyles that are not biblical in nature and expose our children to things that we do not feel are the way God wants us to live, why can they not also hold youth bible studies as well.. And the funniest part is that all the things that society feels are good character and leadership traits, are all taught and displayed in the bible as well. So why would we not want our future generations to be exposed to that as well? It seems to me that Christians are now the ones being persecuted and segregated to me. But what is there to do, just be silent and not share the good news out of fear? Is that what God wants us to do? Hasn't it always been this way and God tells us to not be silent no matter the cost?
-Just trying to find my real purpose and determine what example I need to be setting for my children and others....
Like most consulting and audit firms' white papers, this report from KPMG Advisory, The evolution of risk and controls: From score-keeper to business partner is long on sales and short on specifics. There is enough meat to make it worth reading, however, and it addresses an important question: are audit, compliance and/or corporate ethics programs ever more than a cost of doing business or can they add strategic value? I think the latter can be the case, but because most businesses see compliance and ethics as constraints and not as enablers, they lack the imagination to see where ethical business practices can give them an advantage in the marketplace. Clearly, since this is close to the central question I'm looking at these days from a research standpoint, more will come on this topic.
A recent article in Harvard Business Review looks at a study by Professor Dana Carney that concludes that Powerful People are Better Liars. This is one more nail in the coffin of the idea of the charismatic CEO (I'll post other references to this problem when I get a chance to look them up). Relying on a single charismatic leader, combined with several social cognitive biases, can add up to very dodgy ethical behaviour. If anyone has any contrary opinions on this, I'd be interested to hear it because all the evidence seems to be pointing in one direction. On the other hand, a charismatic leader is sometimes what's needed to really motivate people to sacrifice for a cause, so it's a bit of a catch-22. Comments?
Part of my hypothesis about risk and ethical decision making is that many of the problems faced in the business context are not consequences of bad character but of cognitive bias. I came across this fantastic illustrated guide to cognitive bias that was released by the Royal Society of Account Planning: A Visual Study Guide to Cognitive Bias
Though they tend to be a bit short on data and long on supposition, two recent reports by the Institute of Business Ethics (IBE) and Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) tackle the issue of the link between ethics and strategy head-on. "Managing Responsible Business," the more comprehensive of the two reports, is written jointly by the IBE and CIMA. It suggests that in future, an ethical and/or sustainable business model (it seems to conflate the two at times) will be a universal necessity for doing business in the long term. The other report, which is a discussion paper really, is titled "Incorporating ethics into strategy: developing sustainable business models." They are both well worth reading and I'm interested in feedback from anyone on these papers. I'll have some further comments once I've finished the series on strategic default.
My reflections on this topic ended up being far too long for a single blog post, so I've divided it into three for easier reading. I'll post them over the next three days).
Part I: Strategic Default: What is it, and why would anyone consider doing it?
Although he claims not to like the word "ethics" because he feels it denotes too firm a demarcation between permissible and impermissible activities, David Chillders does nice job of linking ethics, risk, and compliance in this 50 minute talk. While I disagree with some of his intermediate conclusions, the founder of EthicsPoint is right track and this is well worth a listen if this topic interests you.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n45W60zxiGk
I'm finding the issue of strategic default to be a rich one for reflection, so the blog post on it will be posted later today.
In doing some research on the emerging trend of "strategic default" from an ethical perspective, I came across two programs, one audio, one video, on the banking crisis. While not strictly concerned with business ethics, these programs do a nice job in explaining the mistakes of human cognition/decision making that led to the crisis. Ultimately, I think, these perceptual shortcomings, combined with or magnified by unreflective profit-seeking, were to blame for the crisis, not a wholesale breakdown in ethics (or even a one-sided breakdown, which side you blame depending on your political/economic commitments).
For a very fun, non-technical introduction, you can't do better than This American Life's episode, co-produced by the people responsible for the Planet Money blog, "The Giant Pool of Money". It looks at the crisis from the perspectives of several players in the mortgage production chain (borrower, mortgage broker, banker) and describes how an excess of global capital helped drive the market frenzy for securitized mortgage obligations of various sorts. There is a follow-up program that is worth listening to, as well, "The Return to the Giant Pool of Money".
For a more technical, yet still very accessible, introduction to the crisis, I suggest watching a brief talk given by Andrew Lo, who is the Director of the MIT Sloane School's Laboratory for Financial Engineering. Titled Are Mathematical Models the Cause for Financial Crisis in the Global Economy?, he spends most of the talk providing the best introduction to the actual process of securitization that I've seen (and I'm someone who spent a good deal of my time actually working with the rating agencies, investment banks, and capital markets experts in putting these securities together). While I don't think Lo actually answers the question adequately (the answer, in my opinion, is "no, the models didn't cause the crisis, but the use of dodgy, short-term data and blind reliance on the models did"), the entire 50 minute talk is well worth your time if you want to get a high-level technical introduction to how securitization works and how it magnified the housing bubble and debt crisis.
I'm interested to hear from anyone who has other sources to help people understand the financial crisis. Part of what caused the bubble was that actors all along the mortgage production chain didn't look carefully enough at the parts of the process they weren't involved in. This led to a blind faith that "if the investment banks say the bonds are good, they must be good" and "if Countrywide thought this was a good loan, it must be a good loan", etc. (I was actually guilty of the first one, looking back). If everyone had understood what other parts of the chain were doing, we might have seen the developing crisis much earlier than we did and been able to mitigate some of the worst effects.
Also, as I mentioned above, I'm working on an ethical analysis of "strategic default" and if anyone has any perspectives they'd like to share on it (pro, con, or otherwise), I'd be really interested to hear them.
An article released today in the New York Times on a controversy regarding Wikipedia and the Rorschach test, which made reference to another article in Scientific American Mind, What's Wrong With This Picture, brought to mind several interesting (to me, anyway) questions. The Mind article discusses the use, abuse, and general un-supportibility of the famous Rorschach test as a diagnostic instrument. Because there is no single way to interpret the test, and because there is tremendous variability in the interpretations by various practitioners, the article claims, its usefulness as a test of anything is doubtful. The authors argue that the test, as well as other “projective” tests, should be abandoned until tests can be developed that are both standardized and predictable.
Yet, they go on to say, there has been substantial resistance from many practitioners to discontinuing its use. And this is the really interesting part to me. Why would you continue to use a tool, no matter what your line of work, that was shown to be of questionable value? This is not an isolated instance. If you look at the history of thought, science, business, and many others, you see people clinging to tools and ideas long after they have been shown to be either less useful than other tools, at best, or downright useless or damaging. A few examples:
An editorial in yesterday’s New York Times addresses a deservedly sensitive issue in the world of business ethics: compensation. Of specific interest to me, this editorial homes in on most important question: the relationship between risk and reward with regard to pay. While the Times editorial focuses primarily on the legislative approach to this problem (which is some time in the future) the more basic ethical/decision-making issue is how well we judge risk in the short term vs. the long term and how we are likely to behave when we are rewarded for one kind of risk when the ethical thing to do is focus on the other. In short, are these traders going to make better or worse ethical decisions when they are rewarded for short-term risk taking?
First, the practical considerations. It’s been widely and accurately claimed that much of the market behaviour that led to the debt-based asset bubble was driven by short-term rewards. In fact, if you examine the mortgage value chain, each of the players received rewards and passed the longer-term risk on to the next player. The borrower passed it to the broker, the broker to the bank, the bank to the investment bankers, the investment bankers to the investors. Ultimately, when the risk aggregated with the investors in the longer-term, the system melted down and the effect has been, in large part, the global financial crises.
What the current bankers and traders are doing is much the same. They are paid quarterly or annually for returns on their investments from that period. The previous quarter or year’s transactions aren’t tracked from a compensation perspective. Since most people, lacking a compelling reason, practical, ethical, or otherwise, will act in a way that rewards them, the bankers and traders will continue to focus on short-term gains.
This wouldn’t be a problem if these short-term gains added up to long-terms gains but frequently they don’t. The bailout of the financial system, which has cost the taxpayers of the United States more than a trillion dollars, is the paradigm case of this. What ends up happening, therefore, is that the short-term rewards are expressed privately in the huge (by any measure) bonuses in the financial services industry while the long-term risks are socialized and/or passed on to the investors. Thus we, as an investor nation, end up paying twice: once for the bailout, and again as our 401ks bite the dust. The traders and bankers only get paid.
And herein lies the fundamental ethical question. Is it right to transfer risk from the people who stand to gain from it to people who can only lose? In other words, it’s a question of upside, downside, and time horizon. What the current system does is reward the long-term upside rewards to those who only have short-term risk, the traders and investment bankers. It also places this downside risk mostly with the long-term investors/tax-payers. So, contrary to the mythology of free-market fundamentalists, the risk-takers aren’t truly rewarded, and those who are rewarded aren’t truly taking on risk. I think this could be unpacked much further, but I think what I’m trying to say is clear: by transferring downside risk from those who get for it (Wall Street) to others (investors and taxpayers), the system encourages the traders to act unethically because it rewards them for doing so. Because people are so bad at estimating long-term risk, they end up acting unethically without even knowing it.
I know that there’s a lot more to be explored here. In fact, probably a book’s worth. For example, what about the upside rewards for investors? If the traders are acting in a way that they are supposed to (at least institutionally), how can they be said to be acting unethically. These questions can be answered but they’re out of scope here. The point I’m trying to make is that the system is currently broken, from the perspective of risk, reward, and ethics. The Times is therefore right in thinking it needs to be reformed, probably through legislation and regulation. But it’s also important to understand how it’s broken in order to fix it correctly and this is what I don’t see much discussed in the current debate. I hope my little blog post adds something positive to the discussion.
A Business Idea
This off my usual track of IT-related topics but relates in a general way to business strategy. Driving down the main street of my neighborhood in Long Beach, I noticed the proliferation of cosmetic services outlets, e.g., botox, laser hair removal, chemical peels, microdermabrasion. Now, Belmont Shore is a pretty posh area so it is not surprising that it can support several clinics that have a focus on personal service. It got me thinking, however, about the possibility of doing a roll-up and/or chain/franchise business focusing on economies of scale and marketing to previously un- or under-served markets in the middle-class suburbs.
The idea is that many middle class people are priced out of the cosmetic services market. The high prices of these services are dictated mostly by supply-side economics. Currently these establishments are congregated in affluent neighborhoods and downtown business-heavy locations, both of which have very high fixed costs with regards to real estate. Additionally, due to these high prices most of these clinics are quite small so their customer throughput is limited. This increases the unit cost because one of the other fixed costs, the cost of the supervising physician, is spread out over fewer patients. Finally, since these clinics are mostly stand-alone businesses, they have little or no bargaining power with their suppliers, particularly for capital purchases (e.g. laser hair removal machines). Thus, even though variable costs are fairly low, fixed costs are so high that these services remain out of reach, financially and geographically, to many people.
Even with its currently limited market, the market for these services in quite large and growing. Based on my research , the total market for non-surgical cosmetic procedures in 2005 approached $5B. The market size research is summarized below.
I haven't figured out an elegant (or even inelegant non-labor-intensive) way to post tables with blogger, so you can find the figures at:
jamesdmeacham.dyndns.org/blog/skin.pdf
To tap into both the un- and under-served markets, I suggest a business based on the following:
• Location: Base stores in suburban areas of major cities and urban and suburban areas of smaller cities. This would keep price per square foot low and allow for larger stores, thereby increasing capacity.
• Market Segment: The mass market of suburban women for whom price is still a factor and that are currently priced out of the market. This would grow the overall market.
• Economies of scale: Increase scale in several ways.
A recent article in Wired, YouTube vs. BoobTube clarifies the questions I was considering below. In short, the advertising dollars that used to go to TV have to go somewhere because that model is broken and is in no danger of being fixed. Additionally, a friend sent me the following rebuttal, of sorts, all of which is right on the money and is similarly focused on advertising rather than content. My mistake was looking at YouTube through the lens of iTunes rather than looking at it from an ad revenue perspective. Which, considering that Google's business model is based on advertising, was kind of a huge oversight.
What I don’t get is that Google didn’t pay cash, they paid with Google stock which is selling at more than 55 time earnings. That’s better than paying with cash, right?Thanks, Lynn and Claude, for putting me straight.
What if instead of charging for content, youtube charges for advertising? How much ad revenue can you get from 3 billion videos per month? I think they have a 60% market share, which is good, right? It’s kind of like another TV network, sort of like Fox with a little bit more porn. Do the numbers work from the ad side?
But what if Google was thinking more in competitive terms? Their 60% share compares to 3-5% share for everyone else like Google, msn,… Now, I may be talking out of my ass here, but it seems to me that with Google dominating the search business, their biggest competitive risk is from someone like youtube tying up with someone decent in mainstream search to form a new alternative to Google. Just like we all migrated from Webcrawler to AltaVista to Google, the nightmare to Sergey & Co. is that a new generation Yahoo or god forbid MSN could take it away from them. Youtube could have provided that critical something for someone else to take that leap. Google’s move might make as much defensive sense as it does on pure synergy. Right?
Look at it this way, Google’s market cap is over $117 billion give or take. If they were to lose 1.5% of their market share to a competitor, that’s the cost of youtube.
One of the major issues facing business and IT leaders is determining how much to invest in IT security. Some industries, like financial services and healthcare, have regulatory floors on how little they spend, due to Sarbanes Oxley, Basel II, and HIPPA. But with the ongoing threats of hackers, spammers, Internet terrorists, and identity thieves across all industries, how much to spend is an open question subject to considerable debate. How much is enough?
To answer this question, we must determine the optimal amount of investment, which requires an ROI calculation. Most answers constellate around operational and reputational risk. The usual way of quantifying the return on these risks is with a discounted cash flow where the value of a project is equal to the future cash flows of a project discounted to the present. The formula for NPV, for example, is:
Where C= n the total time of the project, r the discount rate and C is the cash flow at that point in time.
The problem with this approach for IT security is that it doesn’t have any explicit cash flows associated with it. Unless a firm markets its resistance to IT threats as a competitive differentiator (which in turn raises reputational risk further), there is not a measurable marginal difference in cash flows when it invests in IT Security projects.
The ROI of IT Security is therefore usually explained in the negative terms of cost avoidance: by reducing the number of successful attacks, a given project will reduce operational and reputational losses. This would in fact be a great method if there were any way of quantifying what these losses are worth from an operational and reputational perspective. All methods I’ve encountered in my work with clients and employers have been based far more on guesswork than on solid facts. This is nobody’s fault; this is a very hard nut to crack. (More on the several difficulties of these methods in a later entry).
What I suggest is research on a new approach, one that is based on a different part of the NPV calculation: the cost of capital. Instead of focusing on the cash flows, we could look at how operational and reputational risk impact market/financial risk. Since the cost of capital is based on financial risk (measured in beta), we could investigate if there is a correlation between IT security incidents and market beta. The higher the market risk, the higher the coast of capital, and the higher the cost of capital, the more that goes to investors to compensate for risk. Therefore if you could reduce the market risk by reducing the operational and reputational risk through increased IT security spending, your cost of capital would decrease and all your other cash flows would become more valuable.
A firm’s cost of capital is calculated thus:
WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) = (Cost of Equity * % of Equity) + (Cost of
While it is possible for operational risk to have an effect on the cost of debt, for the purposes of this discussion I’m going to limit myself to the cost of equity. There are several ways of calculating the cost of equity, but in this example I’ll use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The formula for CAPM is:
The idea behind CAPM is that the β is a measure of systematic financial risk. What I’m suggesting is that we could develop an analogue of β that measures the relationship of financial risk to operational and reputational risk. If this relationship bears out, the greater the incidence of publicly released security compromises would increase the volatility of the equity, thereby increasing β and in turn, increasing the cost of capital.
There are some obvious obstacles to this method. First, there is likely to be a correlation between the size of quantifiable losses and unquantifiable losses. For example, if a bank were to disclose a $1M loss due to hacking, there would probably be a smaller swing in its stock price than if it disclosed a $10M loss. The problem is that while companies sometimes disclose the incidence of attacks, attaching a value or seriousness to the attacks is far less frequent.
The second issue is that there would have to be a large enough data set about incidents and losses to draw statistically significant conclusions. For obvious reasons (i.e. the whole reason that this method might work), companies are loathe to release information about their operational problems. The only ones they are likely to divulge are those that are large enough to give their investors cash-flow related worries. This would naturally skew the data set even if it was large enough to support significant conclusions.
So while there are some hurdles to making this method work, it would make the lives of CISOs and other InfoSec managers a lot easier when it comes to capital and operational budgeting time. I believe that the potential exists for this to be a valuable tool for showing the value of Information Security and needs further research.
After giving Ade McCormack a hard way to go in my previous post, I need to point out that his current analysis piece in the Financial Times is much more to my liking. And not just because he answers "yes" to the question "Is there value in using strategic IT consultants". His most recent article, which can be found at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/756ef782-6e51-11db-b5c4-0000779e2340,dwp_uuid=4dce8136-4a24-11da-b8b1-0000779e2340.html
is a mostly complimentary review of when and why a firm would want to use strategic IT consultants, a question near and dear to my heart. He is right in some of his criticisms of consultants (more likely to offer justification for what you already believe than challenging ideas, creating recommendations based on the consultants needs or related offerings, illogical billing schemes), as well.
The essence of his recommendation boils down to this:
Good reasons for using consultants include:
- Where a culture change is required and an independent catalyst is necessary;
- Where the expertise does not exist inhouse;
- Where their use will save you time;
- Where you might benefit from the consultant’s wider experience by way of cross-pollination.
In a recent article in the Financial Times, Ade McCormick, consultant and author, presents a provocative argument for “setting IT free” (Financial Times, “Preparing the IT department for life in the wild”, 18 October 2006. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2529b45a-5e85-11db-afac-0000779e2340.html. Full text follows below). He draws an analogy between lazy, sedentary zoo animals and IT departments which, while a bit pejorative toward those that are fortunate to have the remaining, non-offshored IT jobs, has more than a little truth in it. As someone who has worked in his share of Fortune 500 IT shops, I’ve seen what can happen to IT shops that aren’t held responsible, on a constant basis, for what their customers need and want. But is his suggested cure as helpful as his diagnosis? While many IT departments deliver sub-optimal value to their customers, is throwing them to a Darwinist lion’s den the best way to encourage value creation in corporate IT departments?
The essence of McCormick’s argument is that by cutting the financial ties by which a firm funds IT, basically making it an independent service provider, it will provide more value:
But why should the IT department “bust a gut” to finish something today if there are actually no consequences for failure? And why should the helpdesk improve its bedside manner? What are your alternatives?There is an instinctive logic to this argument. Why not, in fact, make IT act like an independent firm, forcing it to provide value and proper customer service or abandon the effort to service providers that can? There are definitely pros to the argument.
Well perhaps it is time to release the IT staff into the wild.
- Step one – cease to have an IT budget.
- Step two – invite the IT department to bid for the contract to run the company’s infrastructure.
- Step three – announce that in respect of applications, the IT department will have to convince the heads of sales, marketing, logistics and so on that they should spend some of their budget on IT.
By Ade McCormack
Published: October 18 2006 11:34 | Last updated: October 18 2006 11:34
You have an item in your to-do list to spend some time with your (grand-)children. With fond memories of your own childhood, you decide to take them to the zoo.
But as you walk around the animal enclosures, the kids complain, somewhat disappointingly, that it is cruel to keep the animals in captivity and that this is the cause of the beasts’ apparent listlessness.
You note that the lions just lie there. Their only movement being to check the zoo clock to establish how soon lunch will be served. You similarly notice that most of the animals seem to have lost their edge and have probably lost all need to rely on their natural instincts.
But surely they enjoy a better quality of life by living in a safe environment enjoying the charity of mankind. Why, even their romantic liaisons are prearranged.
As usual, and particularly as you get older, every second thought is business-oriented. You look for parallels. The IT department comes to mind.
The IT staff live in an enclosed environment, or so it seems, protected by perimeter security (aka the help desk).
They tend to remain fairly motionless unless prodded into action. Most of the time they appear happy tinkering with technology toys regardless of what is happening outside the ivory tower.
You take the thought further and conclude that they receive a budget more or less regardless of their performance. OK, the CFO may exert some downward pressure on the figure, but in essence they are receiving a periodic charitable donation.
And for that you receive a variable quality service that is characterised by a “mañana” mentality.
But why should the IT department “bust a gut” to finish something today if there are actually no consequences for failure? And why should the helpdesk improve its bedside manner? What are your alternatives?
Well perhaps it is time to release the IT staff into the wild.
■ Step one – cease to have an IT budget.
■ Step two – invite the IT department to bid for the contract to run the company’s infrastructure.
■ Step three – announce that in respect of applications, the IT department will have to convince the heads of sales, marketing, logistics and so on that they should spend some of their budget on IT.
This will perhaps be something of a shock to the CIO and might well induce “startled rabbit” syndrome. To ameliorate the situation, the IT department can be told it will have the IT infrastructure business for three years, once the financials and service levels are agreed. And that the heads of department will be able to look for alternative IT services in the wider market after one year.
But here is the good news: the IT department will be able to bid for work beyond the business. In other words, they are going to become a genuine service provider.
What a great career-developing opportunity for a CIO. A stint running an IT service company will smooth the transition to board member and perhaps one day to CEO.
The net effect of this budgetary upheaval will be to tear the hermetically sealed fabric that has protected the IT department from the commercial world. Darwinism becomes the latest IT methodology.
With an “eat what you kill” mantra, the IT department now has to win business and deliver successfully. No time now for pet projects. If nobody is paying, it does not get done. Amazingly, this will also trigger the IT department into being more innovative. Survival (aka, winning business) tends to bring out one’s creative side.
This might seem cruel. But then so is cosseting your children. Not preparing them for the real world will make them vulnerable to those more streetwise.
Similarly, mollycoddling IT staff will make them prey to more streetwise operators such as the IT service companies. Some tough love now will give them a fighting chance when the organisation is faced with making outsourcing-related decisions.
Everyone benefits. Users get what they need, when they need it. The CIO is no longer at the mercy of the CFO in respect of budget.
And as mentioned, the IT staff acquire some life skills.
So now it is time to turn your IT zoo into a safari park. Go on, be a tiger.
Ade McCormack (ade@auridian.com) is founder of Auridian (www.auridian.com), which helps organisations get best value from their IT investment. He is also author of ‘IT Demystified – The IT handbook for business professionals’, available via www.auridian.com/book.Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
Yesterday's news that Google would be acquiring YouTube appears to have come as a surprise to nearly no-one.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/business/09cnd-deal.html?em&ex=1160625600&en=ed0019bf33333b8d&ei=5087%0A
What surprised me, however, was the $1.65B valuation Google placed on the business-model-less YouTube. Even more shocking still was Wall Street's positive reaction to the deal, driving up Google's stock price over $8 after the announcement. This made me reflect: what do these guys know that I don't know, and what are the possible justifications for such a high valuation for a business that has never had a positive cash flow? And does this deal represent, even in a small way, a return to the bubble years of the late 90's, as it was then we saw stratospheric valuations on companies with non-existent or dubious business models.
The usual way of doing a merger valuation are based on marginal discounted cash flows based on various kinds of synergies. Some of the possible value drivers for these cash flows are:
It seems that the first two are unlikely. Scale is much less likely to be a factor in a business like Google's and, seriously, in the case of either eyeballs or advertisers, YouTube is not likely to bring them a much bigger footprint.
There is an argument for market entry being a driver for the acquisition, though it's not a strong argument. Google is already a player in the video distribution business.
So it seems, by an large, a technology/product assets play. What they've bought is a technology platform that can be integrated into their pre-existing video search capabilities. The question is: how will they monitize it?
A good part of YouTube's attractiveness is that it is free. You can spend hours searching through forgotten 80's bands to find that one Adam and the Ants video you remember from your junior year in high school (or so I've heard). Would a person be willing then to spend $2 for it? Perhaps. More to the point, would you be willing to pay anything to watch a break dancing midget or other stupid human tricks.
This has been tried before. Remember Napster? They too had a huge user base but, once it was no longer free, it was no longer attractive. There are some things that are only compelling when they are free, and I suspect videos of dancing midgets are among those things.
But lets assume, for the sake of argument, that people would be willing to pay good money to watch old episodes of Dynasty and sophomoric videos. How much would Google need to bring in to make this worth $1.65B. Here's a look at my quick, back of the envelope calculations:
Assumptions:
Starting unit volume: 15,000,000. Assumption
Price per view: $1.99. Current video price at itunes and google
Google share: 30%. Google press release
SGA: 20%. Software industry average
Net per view: $0.60 Figured
Tax Rate: 35%. US Corporate tax rate
Variable Costs, per vid: $0.10 Assumption
Cost of Capital: 12.50%. GOOG's WACC, Bear Stearns, http://battellemedia.com/archives/GOOG_012606.pdf#search=%22google%20WACC%22
Growth Rate: 400%. Assumption, approximately itunes store's 2004-2006 growth
Based on these assumptions, Google's NPV for 5 years (with no terminal value assumed), would be $1.64B. I played around with a number of scenarios to get this figure, but this is the most reasonable one, it seems to me. This would mean that over the course of 5 years Google would need to sell 11,750,000,000 (11.75B) videos.
The two most sensitive assumptions are the initial volume and the growth rate. The initial volume is a mostly a guess, though it is supported by Apple's early video sales, selling a little over a million videos a month. The growth rate is really the more critical assumption. When Apple entered the song market in 2004, it was the only player and continues to have hegemony over the entire digital music value chain. I just can't see, with Apple's dominance in this market, along with video industry incumbents like TiVo, Blockbuster, DirectTV and the like also entering the market, that Google will be able to generate anything like a 400% CAGR.
So do I think this is a return to the days of the $1B vaporware valuation? No. This valuation is not totally out of the range of possibility. I do, however, think that it is based on such incredibly optimistic assumptions about the potential market and growth rate that Google's shareholders will not look back on this acquisition fondly.
This afternoon when Fulham Football Club, the west London team I support, scored a convincing 3-0 victory over Midlands team West Bromwich Albion, they climbed 5 places and out of the relegation zone. Having your team in relegation trouble, even in the middle of the season, is never a good feeling, so I was looking over the EPL league table and I noticed some statistical, or at least historical, oddities. Just one more win would bring Fulham into the top half of the table, and two wins (assuming none of the other other teams won) would put them back into contention for a Europa League spot (they reached, and lost, the Final of the Europa League last year, the highest position in any competition they've every reached...we're just hoping they don't follow the example of the last English team to reach and lose. Middlesbrough were relegated the next year and went down a further league the year after-where they languish today).
I’ve been wanting to learn photography pretty much forever. Since seeing some shots of Katherine Hepburn and Jimmy Stewart when I was in high school, I remember thinking that the talent of the photographer is a special one, a special way of seeing the world. It is much like that of an artist but it works within greater constraints. This, I’ve always thought, makes photography a special art and I’m always willing to drive for photographic art shows and my prize artistic possession is a fantastic photo of some ruins taken in the bahamas and printed with a platinum process.
It’s taken me thirty years, but I’ve just got round to buying some camera equipment and taking a class. My first tripod arrived today and it took some restraint not to blow off work and head out. See, I’ve had my eye on this one particular subject for a while. It’s sort of Fritz Lang meets David Cronenberg with a bit of the Louvre thrown in. It also happens to be our local combination steam generation and wastewater treatment plant. I’ve searched on the web and was in fact able to come up with some photos of the plant, though in fact there are far fewer than I would have expected:
Me: Hello Officer. I was half expecting you.
Officer Hernandez: You’re going to need to stop taking pictures.
M: You got it. I’m taking a class and I think this is a really cool building.
OH: You are going to need to delete the pictures you’ve taken.
M: Really? Good thing I’ve only taken a few (or so I thought).
OH: Why are you taking pictures out here?
M: Well, I’m taking this class, and I think this is a really cool building. It’s kind of David Chronenberg meets Fritz Lang with a little bit of the Louvre thrown in. Know what I mean. in Paris.
OH: In Paris?
M: See, you know what I’m talking about.
OH: You’re going to need to delete the pictures you’ve taken.
M: No problem.
Me: So, I didn’t know it’s illegal to take pictures here.
Officer Hernandez: It’s not.
M: It’s not? So why are we deleting pictures, or trying to delete pictures, from my camera if I’m allowed to take pictures here.
OH: You’re not allowed to take pictures here.
M: I’m not trying to be difficult, officer, as you can tell by the fact I’m doing whatever you ask of me, but I’m a little confused. If it’s not illegal, it must be allowed, I would think.
OH: You need a permit.
M: A permit?
OH: Yes, you need to go down to the security office downtown and get a permit.
M: There’s a permit for taking pictures at the plant. What’s it called so I know what to ask for?
OH: Talk to Lieutenant Rodriguez. All the films and still photo shoots and have to go through him.
M: As flattering as that is, Officer, I’m taking a photo class at Santa Monica College. Do you really think this is the same as Marty Scorcese wanting to do a picture here?
Gabe and I had originally planned to forgo our yearly soccer excursion to England to go watch England win the European Championship in Switzerland. Problem was, England choked and didn't even make the final 32. So we needed a new plan. Thus was born the pan-Europe football 2008 trip, the plane tickets for which we bought last week: 21 Days, 9 cities, and as many football matches as we can fit in.
If you have Google Earth you can see the trip interactively at:
Google Map Link
We're doing a counter-clockwise circuit of the major footballing cities of Europe: Munich, Amsterdam, London (had to!), Paris, Madrid, Barcelona, Milan, and Rome. I thought we should go to Lisbon, as well, but Gabe hasn't forgiven Portugal for beating England in the quarter-finals of the World Cup last year.
We are naturally looking for cheap places to stay, and the trip is going from 14 August to 4 Sept.
Ethics and Compliance consultant with specialisations in governance, risk, and behavioural ethics.
Extensive background in strategy (business and technology), Enterprise Architecture, and management consulting.
Certification in Corporate Compliance and Ethics (CCEP, awarded)
Certification in Risk Management (CRISC, awarded)
Specialties: • Ethics and Compliance
o Code of Ethics/Conduct development
o Ethics/Compliance audit
o Reporting/ombudsman
• Business Strategy
o Strategic planning
o Competitive assessments
o Industry structure/trend analysis
• Information Security
• Technology Strategy
o Technology research and strategic planning
o IT governance/organizational design
• Enterprise Architecture
o Business/IT alignment
o Standards development
Advised Fortune 1000 clients over a variety of industry verticals on ethics, compliance, risk, and governance. Projects included:
* Cultural Risk Assessments
--Surveys
--Focus Groups
* Codes of Conduct
--Rewrites
--Benchmarking
* Risk Assessments
* Corporate Policies
--Rewrite
--Benchmarking
* Engagement Management
http://www.magister-consulting.com
IT Strategy and Performance
.IT Effectiveness Diagnostic
.Strategy Process Development
.Spot “Pain Point” Strategy Diagnostic
.IT Metrics Development
.Project Portfolio Evaluation
.Project/Program Approval Process Design
.Organizational Design
.Asset Allocation Analysis
Enterprise Architecture
.Architecture Planning
.IT and Architecture Governance
.Application Portfolio Rationalization
.Reference Architecture
.Standards, Models, Principles, and Policies
.Architecture Metrics, Performance Management and Communications
.Demand Management
.Vendor Relationship Management
Competitive Technology Strategy
.Customer Needs Research
.Market Size and Dynamics Analysis
.Technology Assets Evaluation
.IP Portfolio Analysis
.R&D Investment Evaluation
Vice President, Business Strategy and Analysis, Long Beach Mortgage Company (2004)
• Reporting to President and CFO, built business strategy capability for sub-prime mortgage lending business unit with $15B revenue.
• Created and facilitated strategic planning process to develop 2004-2007 plan.
• Conducted analyses focused on industry and competitive dynamics, competitive positioning, market sizing and attractiveness, and company strengths and weaknesses.
Vice President, Technology Research Group and Emerging Technologies Department
• Reporting to SVP of Research, Planning, and Architecture, created and led technology research and strategy group to align enterprise architecture and emerging technologies with business objectives and strategies.
• Created technology competitive intelligence group.
• Developed emerging technologies framework to iteratively track new technologies and architectures with respect to business priorities and technology industry trends.
• Researched, developed, and sold projects internally including Consumer Smart Card, Enterprise Linux, Web Services and Service Oriented Architectures.
• Partnered with WM Venture Capital Fund to invest in companies with synergistic technologies.
Collaborated with Business Units and technical groups in creating technical architecture and technology strategy with particular emphasis on developing technical standards based on business drivers.
Developed Enterprise Architecture Framework.
Authored technical strategy on Bluetooth, Public Key Infrastructure, Single Sign On, and Password Management.
Wrote white papers on Customer Relationship Management, Enterprise Architecture, and Wireless technologies.
Created and taught the course Unix System Design and Administration focusing on scalable, extensible, and secure architectures and the administration of enterprise grade systems.
Taught all levels of the OSI model and appropriate use of hardware, software, and security measures.
Led technical team in all aspects of developing, maintaining, and administering an international website, network, and associated technologies.
Designed distributed VPN system to allow thirty international field offices secure access to network.
Developed n-tier architecture and created standards for infrastructure and development.
Managed technical operations and oversaw team of system administrators and web developers.
Performed development and system administration duties through entire development life cycle.
Had operational responsibility for network and platform services
Developed internal intranet as well as public website in a multi-tiered, object-oriented system.
Unix System Administration
Web Development
Network Design and Administration
Unix, Macintosh, and Network System Administrator, Help Desk Representative